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Highly pathogenic avian inﬂ   uenza A (HPAI) subtype 
H5N1 has caused family case clusters, mostly in Southeast 
Asia, that could be due to human-to-human transmission. 
Should this virus, or another zoonotic inﬂ  uenza virus, gain 
the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission, an in-
ﬂ  uenza pandemic could result. We used statistical methods 
to test whether observed clusters of HPAI (H5N1) illnesses 
in families in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, and eastern Tur-
key were due to human-to-human transmission. Given that 
human-to-human transmission occurs, we estimate the in-
fection secondary attack rates (SARs) and the local basic 
reproductive number, R0. We ﬁ  nd statistical evidence of hu-
man-to-human transmission (p = 0.009) in Sumatra but not 
in Turkey (p = 0.114). For Sumatra, the estimated household 
SAR was 29% (95% conﬁ   dence interval [CI] 15%–51%). 
The estimated lower limit on the local R 0 was 1.14 (95% 
CI 0.61–2.14). Effective HPAI (H5N1) surveillance, contain-
ment response, and ﬁ  eld evaluation are essential to monitor 
and contain potential pandemic strains.
H
ighly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza A (HPAI) subtype 
H5N1 is repeatedly crossing the species barrier to 
humans. Since December 2003, a total of 291 cases of 
HPAI (H5N1) have been reported in humans, resulting in 
172 deaths (i.e., 59% case-fatality ratio) in 12 countries, 
mostly in Southeast Asia (1). Among these cases, 31 fam-
ily clusters have been documented, ranging in size from 
2 to 8 family members. How many of these clusters are 
due to a common avian source and how many are due to 
human-to-human transmission are important facts to deter-
mine. Should one of these HPAI (H5N1) strains gain the 
capacity for sustained human-to-human transmission, the 
resulting outbreak, if not contained, would spread world-
wide through the global transportation network more rap-
idly than adequate supplies of vaccine matched to the new 
variant could be manufactured and distributed (2,3). We 
analyzed data from 2 of the largest of the familial clusters 
to ascertain if human-to-human transmission took place, 
and if so, how transmissible the strain was.
Methods
May 2006 Human Avian Inﬂ  uenza Family 
Cluster, Indonesia
During late April and early May 2006, a cluster of 8 
cases of HPAI (H5N1) was detected and investigated by 
the Indonesian public health surveillance system in north-
ern Sumatra (4–6). All case-patients were members of the 
same extended family. Seven of them resided within 3 ad-
jacent houses in the village of Kubu Sembilang. The re-
maining patient resided with his immediate family in the 
village of Kabanjahe (≈10 km away).
The index patient was a 37-year-old woman, thought to 
have been exposed to dead poultry and chicken fecal mate-
rial before onset of illness. She also reportedly maintained 
a market stall that sold live chickens. Although her illness 
was not conﬁ  rmed to have been caused by avian inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1), her death on May 5, 2006, is suspected to be the 
result of HPAI (H5N1) infection because of her reported 
symptoms, illness progression, and prior contact with dis-
eased or dead poultry.
Twenty members of her extended family are suspected 
to have been in contact with her, many during a family gath-
ering on April 29, 2006 (7). At that time, she was manifest-
ing symptoms (i.e., she had a heavy cough, was severely ill, 
and was prostrate). That night, 9 of these members slept in 
the same small room as she did (indicated by a black trian-
gle in online Appendix Figure 1, available from www.cdc.
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gov/EID/content/13/9/1348-appG1.htm). Of these 9 family 
members, 2 of her sons (15 and 17 years of age) and her 
25-year-old brother, who lived in Kabanjhe, became ill in 
the next 3 weeks. The sons died. The brother was the only 
person from this family cluster to recover.
Of the remaining 11 family members, 4 became ill and 
died. The 29-year-old sister of the index patient, who lived 
in an adjacent house, became ill after she provided direct 
personal care to her ill sister (7). The 18-month-old daugh-
ter of this sister also became ill after she was in the pres-
ence of the index patient with her mother. The 10-year-old 
nephew of the index patient, who lived in the other house 
adjacent to hers, became ill after he attended the fam-
ily gathering and frequently visited his aunt’s house. The 
nephew’s father became ill after he personally cared for 
his son. The possibility that HPAI (H5N1) was transmitted 
from the nephew to his father is also supported by genetic 
sequencing data (4). Though symptoms did not develop in 
the mother of the nephew, she was directly exposed to her 
husband during his illness. All case-patients, except for the 
index patient, were conﬁ  rmed as inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) positive 
by PCR. The nephew’s mother was conﬁ  rmed as inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) negative. As an intervention, 54 surviving rela-
tives and close contacts were identiﬁ  ed and placed under 
voluntary quarantine (7). All of these persons, except for 
pregnant women and infants, received oseltamivir prophy-
lactically.
December 2005 Human Avian Inﬂ  uenza Family Cluster, 
Eastern Turkey
From December 18, 2005, (8) to January 15, 2006 (9), 
a cluster of 8 conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) cases was de-
tected in Dogubayazit District in eastern Turkey (online 
Appendix Figure 2, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/con-
tent/13/9/1348-appG2.htm) (10–13). These case-patients 
were among 21 members of 3 households located within 
1.5 km of each other (14). All conﬁ  rmed case-patients were 
hospitalized after onset of symptoms (9). Four of the con-
ﬁ  rmed case-patients died; the other 4 recovered (9). Ten 
of the remaining 14 household residents were hospitalized 
with avian inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms but were never con-
ﬁ  rmed to be infected with inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) (9). All but 
one of the hospitalized residents were children (6–15 years 
of age) (9).
Before onset of symptoms, 4 children from 1 house-
hold, 3 of whom had conﬁ  rmed cases (including the index 
patient), were reported to have had close contact with the 
dead bodies of sick chickens (15). The 2 conﬁ  rmed case-
patients in the second household reportedly slaughtered a 
duck together on January 1, 2006, at the beginning of a 
die-off in the household’s ﬂ  ock (14). Two of the remaining 
conﬁ  rmed case-patients lived in the third household and 
had no history of contact with sick or dying poultry. The 
remaining conﬁ  rmed case occurred in a fourth residence 
located near the ﬁ  rst household (10), but because we lacked 
information on the number of household members and the 
case-patient’s exposure history, we excluded it from these 
analyses. Most, if not all, of the 21 residents attended a din-
ner hosted by the family of the index patient on December 
24, 2006, while he was symptomatic (8).
Statistical Methods
We used a previously developed statistical trans-
mission model (16,17) to test whether human-to-human 
transmission occurred, and if it did, to estimate transmis-
sion parameters. In the model, persons mix with one an-
other in households and between households. In addition, 
we include a common source of infection due to zoonotic 
exposure. Mathematical and statistical details are given in 
the online Technical Appendix (available from www.cdc.
gov/EID/content/13/7/1348-Techapp.pdf).
Model of Probability of Transmission
We deﬁ  ne  p1 as the probability that an infectious 
household member infects another household member in 
1 day. If the distribution of the infectious period is known, 
we can obtain the household secondary attack rate (SAR1) 
from p1, deﬁ  ned as the probability that an infectious house-
hold member infects another household member over his or 
her infectious period. Similarly, we deﬁ  ne the daily trans-
mission probability (p2) and the community SAR (SAR2) 
for between household spread. Finally, we deﬁ  ne the daily 
probability (b) that any person is infected from a zoonotic 
source. The contact structure used for parameter estimation 
is shown in the Figure. We assume that the distributions of 
the incubation and infectious periods are predetermined by 
the investigator.
We establish the likelihood function for each person 
and then for the whole population for statistical inference. 
The likelihood function for a person is equivalent to the 
probability of observing the realized data on that person 
throughout the outbreak. The likelihood function for a per-
son labeled i is built with the following steps: 1) Obtain the 
probability that person i is infected by an infectious source 
labeled j on day t, given person i is not infected up to day 
t – 1. If source j is a person, this probability is p1, for the 
same household, or p2 for exposure in the community, mul-
tiplied by the probability of person j being infectious on 
day t. The probability of person j being infectious on day t 
is derived from the symptom-onset day of person j and the 
distribution of the infectious period. If source j is zoonotic, 
the infection probability is b. The probability of escaping 
infection is simply 1 minus the corresponding probability 
of infection. 2) Take the product of the probabilities ob-
tained in step 1 over all humans and zoonotic sources j to 
obtain the probability of person i escaping infection by any 
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infectious source on day t. 3) Take the product of the proba-
bilities obtained in step 2 over all days before and including 
day t to obtain the probability of person i escaping infection 
up to day t. 4) If person i is not infected by the end of the 
outbreak, the likelihood function for person i is the product 
of the probabilities of person i escaping infection up to the 
last day of observation. 5) If person i is observed to have 
symptom onset on day t ~ and the infection time is known 
to be t, the probability of the data regarding person i is the 
product of 3 pieces of information: a) the probability of 
person i escaping infection up to day t – 1, b) the probabil-
ity that person i is infected on day t, and c) the probability 
that the duration of the incubation period is t ~ – t. Because 
we do not observe the infection time, the likelihood func-
tion for person i is obtained by summing the above product, 
a – c, over all potential values of t.
The likelihood function for the whole population is 
the product of all the individual likelihood functions. In 
the event that human-to-human transmission occurs, SAR 
estimates are used to estimate the local basic reproductive 
number (R0), which is deﬁ  ned as the average number of 
secondary cases infected by a typical index case-patient in 
the beginning of the outbreak (online Technical Appen-
dix). There is potential for sustained transmission if R0 is 
>1. If human-to-human transmission is determined to be 
occurring, then the above parameters are estimated from 
the symptom dates and contact information from the popu-
lation under study. Data on exposed persons who do not 
become ill form an important component of the inference 
procedure.
Statistical Test
We set up a statistical test with the null hypothesis be-
ing that no human-to-human transmission occurs, that is, 
p1 =  p2 = 0. The alternative hypothesis is either p1 or p2 is 
not equal to 0, or both are not equal to zero. The test sta-
tistic we use is proportional to the ratio of the maximum 
value of the likelihood function assuming the null hypoth-
esis is true (null likelihood) and the maximum value of the 
likelihood function at the estimated parameter values (full 
likelihood). 
Speciﬁ  cally, we deﬁ  ne the likelihood ratio test statistic 
as –2 log (the null likelihood function divided by the full 
likelihood function). If no human-to-human transmission 
occurs, the 2 likelihood functions would be roughly equal, 
and we expect to see a likelihood ratio close to 1, and, thus, 
a likelihood ratio statistic close to 0. A large value of the 
likelihood ratio statistic is evidence of deviation from the 
null hypothesis. The question is how to obtain a reference 
set of the likelihood ratio statistic values that we would 
see under the null hypothesis. Given no human-to-human 
transmission, all the observed case-patients must have been 
infected by the zoonotic source. Since the exposure to the 
zoonotic source is assumed constant for each person on 
each day, the null likelihood function will not change if we 
reassign the infection and symptom status of the observed 
case-patients to a different group of people in the popula-
tion. By performing such reassignment many times, we ob-
tained a collection of datasets that were each equally likely 
to have been observed had there been no human-to-human 
transmission. The values of the likelihood ratio statistic cal-
culated from these datasets form the null distribution for 
statistical testing. This method is referred to as a permuta-
tion test. The p value is given by the proportion of the ref-
erence values that are equal to or larger than the observed 
likelihood ratio statistic value. More technical details are 
given in the online Technical Appendix.
The probability of infection by the zoonotic source 
may not be estimable together with SAR1 or SAR2 from 
an observed cluster. In such a situation, a statistical test 
of the occurrence of human-to-human transmission is still 
meaningful because the likelihood ratio test statistic is still 
estimable from the permuted datasets.
Data Required
A list of the inputs that are required for estimation and 
statistical testing are listed in the Table. Three categories 
of input parameters are required for this estimation model: 
outbreak-wide, individual level, and analysis parameters. 
The duration of the outbreak, the duration of the incubation 
period for the pathogen, and the minimum and maximum 
durations of the infectious period for the pathogen are the 
required outbreak-wide inputs. For each person, their resi-
dential location (neighborhood and household), their de-
1350  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 9, September 2007
Figure. Schematic of estimation method. An infectious person (in 
red) infects a susceptible person (in green) in the same household 
with probability of household secondary attack rate (SAR1) and 
infects a susceptible person in a different household with probability 
SAR2. The common infectious source (i.e., avian hosts) infects 
a susceptible person with probability b per day. The likelihood 
function is constructed from symptom-onset dates and exposure 
information to estimate the above parametersDetecting Transmission of Avian Inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) 
mographic characteristics (sex and age), and whether they 
were a case-patient or not are required input parameters. 
Case-patients require additional input of their illness-onset 
dates, types of outcome, outcome dates, and whether or not 
they are the index patient in the outbreak. Hospitalization 
and treatment dates (considered prophylactic for nonpa-
tients) are optional input parameters for each person. For 
each person who visits another residence during the out-
break period, his or her identiﬁ  ers, the neighborhood and 
household visited, and the start and end dates of the visit 
are required inputs. Analysis-related inputs include the last 
date of community exposure to potential common sources 
of infection, the last date of observation, and inputs for R0 
estimation (mean number of residents per household and 
mean number of out-of-residence contacts per person per 
day). An expanded version of the model will require the 
input of other exposure information such as from schools 
or hospitals.
Results
For the outbreak in Indonesia, online Appendix Figure 
1 shows that the incubation period had a probable range 
of 3–7 days and the infectious period, a probable range of 
5–13 days. Thus, we let the incubation period have a uni-
form distribution of 3–7 days (mean 5 days) and the in-
fectious period a uniform distribution of 5–13 days (mean 
9 days). For the data shown in online Appendix Figure 1, 
only the household SAR (SAR1) can be estimated. We de-
termine that human-to-human spread did occur by reject-
ing the null hypothesis of no human-to-human transmission 
(p = 0.009). The estimated household SAR is 0.29 (95% 
conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 0.15–0.51). Thus, a single infected 
person in a household infected another household member 
with the probability of 0.29. The average household size 
for rural Indonesia is ≈5 people. Because we do not have 
an estimate of the community SAR, we have an estimate 
of the lower limit of the local R0,, i.e., 1.14 with a 95% CI 
of 0.61–2.14. A sensitivity analysis on the distribution of 
the incubation and infectious period shows that the test and 
estimates for SAR1 and R 0 are insensitive to uncertainty 
about these distributions within plausible ranges.
For the outbreak in Turkey, all the parameters are es-
timable, but we do not reject the null hypothesis of no hu-
man-to-human transmission (p = 0.114). Our estimate of 
the daily probability of infection from the common source 
is 0.011 (95% CI 0.005–0.025).
Discussion
We have presented statistical evidence that the strain 
of HPAI (H5N1) that caused the family cluster of human 
cases in northern Sumatra was spread from human to hu-
man and that the household SAR was 29%. This household 
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Table. Parameters and data used in analysis 
Category Parameter/data  Required*
Outbreak begin date  X
Outbreak end date  X
Latent/incubation period, d†  X
Entire outbreak 
Infectious period, d†  X
Neighborhood of residence  X
Household of residence  X
Sex X
Age, y  X
All persons 
Case status (yes or no)  X
Whether outbreak index case-patient (yes or no)  X
Date of illness onset  X
Outcome (recovered, died, or don’t know/still ill)  X
Date of outcome  X
Dates of hospitalization  O
Case-patients
Period of receiving treatment (dates)  O
Dates of hospitalization  O Non–case-patients 
Period of prophylactic treatment (dates)  O
Identifier for visiting person  X
Neighborhood visited  X
Household visited  X
Inter-residence visits 
Dates of the visit  X
End of exposure to the common source of infection (date)  X Analysis parameters 
Final day of observation (date)  X
Mean no. residents per household  X‡ R0 estimation 
Mean no. community contacts per person/d  X‡
*X, required; O, optional; R0, basic reproduction number. 
†The user defines the distribution of this period, including the minimum and maximum length of the period. 
‡Required to estimate R0.RESEARCH
SAR is similar to statistical estimates for interpandemic 
inﬂ  uenza A in the United States (12.7%–30.6%) (18,19). 
The mean incubation period of this strain appears to have 
been ≈5 days, nearly twice as long as for past pandemic 
strains and current interpandemic strains of inﬂ  uenza. The 
CI for the estimated lower bound for the local R0 covers 
1. Therefore, even though we determined that human-to-
human transmission probably occurred, whether the virus 
was capable of sustained human-to-human transmission is 
not clear. This virus may have required very close human 
contact to be transmitted. Even with no intervention, the 
ﬁ  nding that R0 = 1.14 indicates that the chance that a single 
introduction would result in any further spread is ≈12%. In 
addition, the reported prophylactic use of oseltamivir may 
have played some role in limiting further spread. We did 
not ﬁ  nd statistical evidence of human-to-human spread for 
the outbreak in eastern Turkey. This does not mean that 
no low-level human-to-human spread occurred in this out-
break, only that we lack statistical evidence of such spread. 
The power would be too low to detect such spread for an 
outbreak with 7 total cases and small SARs (17).
We did not consider the role of heterogeneity—such as 
age, sex, treatment status, or quarantine—in transmission. 
The parameters could be made to be functions of time-de-
pendent covariates, as we have done with similar models 
(16,19,20). We can easily extend the model used here for 
covariates; however, we must have sufﬁ  cient data to sup-
port such models.
Computer simulations have shown that the target-
ed use of inﬂ  uenza antiviral agents could be effective in 
containing a potential pandemic strain of inﬂ  uenza at the 
source (21,22), if initiated within 3 weeks of the initial 
case in the community, and if the R0 is <1.8. This strategy, 
known as targeted antiviral prophylaxis, involves treating 
identiﬁ  ed index patients in a mixing group and offering a 
single course of prophylaxis to the contacts of these index 
patients in predeﬁ  ned close contact groups, i.e., households 
at a minimum but also possibly neighborhood clusters, pre-
school groups, schools, and workplaces. In addition, the 
voluntary household quarantine of suspected close contacts 
of case-patients was recommended. Targeted antiviral pro-
phylaxis at the household and neighborhood cluster level 
was carried out for the outbreak in Sumatra.
Ascertaining whether a potential pandemic strain of in-
ﬂ  uenza is capable of sustained human-to-human transmis-
sion and estimating key transmission parameters are im-
portant. To estimate more than the household SAR, more 
detailed community data need to be collected. This would 
include a complete census of potentially exposed house-
holds and persons in the area where immediate transmis-
sion could occur from both potential zoonotic and human 
sources. Such data would enable estimation of important 
parameters and a more complete estimate of the R0 rather 
than just the lower limit.
We have developed a software application, TRANS-
TAT, for implementing these analyses. This application 
provides a stand-alone environment for the entry, storage, 
and analysis of data from outbreaks of acute infectious dis-
eases. A partial list of the input information is given in the 
Table. The statistical methods presented here can be ap-
plied to the data along with several standard epidemiologic 
tools. This information system would allow for real-time 
analysis and evaluation of control measures for an out-
break. We would encourage outbreak investigators to use 
this tool, taking care to input data on the exposed nonpa-
tients as well as case-patients. The authors will provide a 
link to this software upon request.
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